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Introduction 
The sudden death of President Saparmurat Niyazov 
on 21 December 2006 has opened a window for 
engagement between the European Union (EU) and 
Turkmenistan. There appears to be a realisation across 
the Turkmen political elite that Niyazov’s style of 
policy micro-management was unsustainable and 
undesirable, both in terms of its immediate outcomes, 
and for its broader impact on political and social 
cohesion. Accordingly, a more balanced and 
collegiate form of governance is likely to develop 
under the new regime, with power effectively centred 
on a ‘junta’ of influential security officials from 
different clans/regions. Although formal 
democratisation remains a distant prospect, a 
sequence of economic and social changes, initiated 
both from above and below is likely to occur. The 
principal objectives of these will be to reverse 
Niyazov’s most idiosyncratic and unambiguously 
damaging policies, and to commence a process of 
cautious re-engagement with the outside world. What 
is the aim of these changes, repairing the damage of 
the Niazov years or something more ambitious? 
These reforms have the potential to be simultaneously 
emancipating and destabilising. Using a fusion of 
traditional Turkmen and Soviet techniques, paid for 
by gas rents, Niyazov managed to create a regime 
that, for over two decades, rather effectively 
neutralised any actual or potential sources of 
opposition to his rule. Without that primitive overlay, 
the multiplication of political actors, combined with 
necessary reforms to increase the role of the private 
sector, is likely to test the state’s institutional 
strength, and open new internal commercial pressures 
for engagement in and beyond the region. 
At present, Turkmenistan can offer the EU only a 
limited menu of potential goods – a fairly reliable 
supply of cheap natural gas, and a modest addition to 
the Caspian oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
market mix. Given present concerns over Russia’s 
reliability as a long-term supplier of hydrocarbons, 
Turkmen gas reserves have acquired a new salience. 
However, there are significant obstacles in bringing 
them directly to the European market, not the least of 
which is the lack of either an existing infrastructure or 
a compelling incentive for the Turkmen leadership to 
sell the bulk of its onshore gas to Europe. The list of 
‘harms’ to EU interests that might emanate from 
Turkmenistan is also correspondingly limited. The 
interest of Turkmen in radical, politicised Islam has 
historically been extremely limited, but may yet grow 
with the emergence of a disaffected middle-class. The 
prospect of any such radicalisation causing domestic 
political instability, or being targeted at EU interests, 
remains remote. Internal challenges to the current 
government are more likely to stem from internecine 
elite feuds that mask clan/regional interests. Informal 
in-country reports, for example, point to tension in 
Mary  velayet over the perceived exclusion of that 
region’s interests in the elite pacting process that 
occurred in the immediate aftermath of Niyazov’s 
death, and the security services are believed to have 
taken personal control over the administration of the 
presidential election in Mary, no doubt to ensure that 
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there was no regional deviation in the final result.
1 
The most significant security problem is likely to 
remain the use of Turkmen territory for the transit of 
narcotics from Afghanistan and Iran on to Russia and 
Europe. The EU can play an interdiction role in the 
disruption of this trade, but will depend on the 
cooperation of the Turkmen political, military and 
intelligence elites to make an impact. This cannot be 
guaranteed.  
Accordingly, the EU’s principal opportunity to 
engage with Turkmenistan is not likely to carry a 
short-term pay-off. Nor should one be expected. It 
will require careful work to help build the foundations 
of what Weber called a “legal-rational” system of 
governance, underpinned by significant assistance, 
without conditionalities, in the education and health 
sectors. There is clearly a very serious debate going 
on within the Turkmen elite about its preferred form 
of relationship with Russia (and China)
2. Heavy-
handed democracy promotion at the outset is likely to 
predetermine that outcome by driving the new regime 
into the arms of Moscow and Beijing. By focusing on 
technical governance issues, while making available 
the option of alternative natural gas export routes, the 
EU can assist in laying the foundations for genuine 
cooperation which will carry a more significant and 
uncomplicated political, security and commercial 
dividend in the medium-term.  
The remainder of this paper is structured into four 
sections: the first analyses of the reconfiguration 
within the Turkmen political elite occasioned by 
Niyazov’s death, and assesses its likely impact on 
domestic policy; the second section focuses on the 
important changes in the organisation and functions 
of the oil and gas sector in the period immediately 
before and after Niyazov’s death, and considers how 
the Turkmen government may seek to realise its main 
priorities for energy sector development; the third 
section seeks to explain the rationale behind post-
Soviet Turkmen foreign policy in order to gauge 
whether and how the government is likely to reorient 
policy after the long period of relative isolation under 
Niyazov. The paper concludes by offering some 
specific policy suggestions for greater EU 
engagement with Turkmenistan that may encourage 
the country’s re-integration into the global 
community, while assisting the EU to extend its 
diplomatic and moral reach into Central Asia.  
                                                 
1 See “Turkmenistan after Niyazov”, International Crisis 
Group Asia Policy Briefing No.60, 12 February 2007. 
2 Note the comments made by Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov on 27 January 2007 (Itar-TASS, 27 January 
2007), and the cool response from Ashgabat to the Russian 
proposal for a gas OPEC (Russian Oil and Gas Report, 2 
February 2007). The Russian delegation to 
Berdymuhammedov’s inauguration received reassurances 
on existing contracts only, despite a reportedly generous 
package of assistance offered by Gazprom (Gazeta, 15 
February 2007).  
The domestic political landscape 
Prior to 21 December 2006, Turkmenistan could 
fairly be described as a ‘sultanistic regime’. President 
Niyazov ruled through a mixture of fear and rewards, 
using natural gas rents to furnish patronage networks 
and a coercive apparatus centred on the security 
services and the Presidential Guard. Augmenting 
these techniques of material control was a pervasive 
cult of personality built around certain motifs, texts 
and symbols associated with Niyazov himself, as well 
as other approved figures
3. The cult of personality 
fulfilled several important functions. It was (and 
remains) an important instrument of social integration 
in a society where national identity remains weak. It 
expressed the regime’s visual and spatial power, 
particularly in the urban redesign of Ashgabat, where 
it presented a continual reminder to Turkmen of the 
source of their political independence and heavily 
subsidised basic provisions. The cult was, through 
Niyazov’s books, particularly Ruhnama (I and II), an 
important mechanism for political socialisation, 
offering a normative navigational aid for Turkmen in 
the uncertain waters of post-Soviet transition. Finally, 
the cult increasingly functioned as an important 
strategic resource for mid to upper level officials who, 
by originating ever more extravagant projects, hoped 
to preserve or advance their own and/or their region’s 
interests
4.  
The formal political landscape theoretically provided 
checks to presidential power but, in reality, rarely did 
so. The Turkmen State Constitution is actually a 
relatively liberal document, providing for a separation 
of the branches of government and protection of the 
rights of the individual against unnecessary state 
intrusion. Although the President is accorded 
significant powers, the sovereign organ of state power 
is the Khalk Maslahaty (People’s Council), a unique 
fusion of the executive, legislature and judiciary, 
comprising 2507 appointed and elected delegates that 
sits for a few days once or twice every year. However, 
the Council has functioned principally as a vehicle for 
the approval of government policy and the ritual 
acclaim of Niyazov. The election of 
Berdymuhammedov to be Khalk Maslahaty 
(Chairman) at an extraordinary session convened on 
30-31 March 2007, suggests that this practice will 
remain essentially unchanged for the foreseeable 
future. The Majlis, a 50 member Parliament which 
effectively succeeded the Soviet Congress of People’s 
Deputies, undertook the execution of daily 
government business with minimal dissent from the 
prearranged line of Niyazov and the Cabinet of 
Ministers. Two comments should be made about this 
rather bleak and flattened landscape. Firstly, a process 
                                                 
3 These included Niyazov’s deceased parents. 
4 For more detail on the Niyazov cult see the author’s PhD. 
thesis, “Why do sultanistic regimes arise and persist? A 
Study of Government in the Republic of Turkmenistan, 
1992-2006”, University of Leeds, 2006.    
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of minimal but significant liberalisation, that has 
passed virtually unnoticed, was under way before 
Niyazov died, possibly to assuage criticism from 
international institutions such as the OSCE, but also 
perhaps to introduce a highly controlled outlet for the 
expression of political pluralism and, in the case of 
the constitutional amendments, to broaden the net of 
possible successors. Elections to the Majlis and Khalk 
Maslahaty in 2004 and 2006 respectively were 
increasingly, within limits, competitive, albeit 
between candidates pre-selected for their reliability. 
Not all candidates belonged to the Democratic Party 
of Turkmenistan, the country’s only legal political 
party, although there were almost certainly pre-
selected for their political docility – although all were 
no doubt hand picked. The Constitution was amended 
twice in 2005 in order to liberalise eligibility for the 
presidency, a sign that Niyazov’s health was known 
to be fragile but that a successor had not yet been 
settled upon. The second point is that, traditionally, 
Turkmen politics has been conducted consensually. 
Pre-Soviet Turkmen tribal maslakhaty  (village 
councils) were acephalous, ad hoc affairs with no 
permanent leadership, except in periods of conflict.
5 
Where a decision could not be reached unanimously it 
was deferred until complete agreement was possible. 
Even persistent dissenters eventually felt obliged to 
fall in behind and support the communal decision 
wholeheartedly, knowing that some concession would 
have been formulated to accommodate their views. 
The alternative was to leave the group entirely. 
Adversarial politics in Turkmenistan is not a sign of 
health, but an act of treachery against group interests, 
a perspective that was of great incidental utility to 
Soviet officials. Niyazov effectively combined and 
adapted the traditional and Soviet ways of seeing and 
doing politics, retaining the forms of consensuality 
without the content.  
Niyazov’s death left the state constitutionally, 
institutionally and politically unprepared for the 
succession. In the event, nothing short of a coup 
d’état was accomplished in the hours afterwards. The 
Speaker of the Majlis, the constitutionally designated 
successor, was arrested and rather bizarrely charged 
with harassing a young female relative and other 
unspecified acts of corruption. Minister of Health 
Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov was appointed as the 
acting president, and then duly confirmed in this post 
by a sitting of the Khalk Maslahaty on 26 December 
2006, before securing the inevitable election landslide 
victory against five nominal opponents on 11 
February 2007. In this respect, the choice of 
                                                 
5 William Irons, The Yomut Turkmen: A Study of Social 
Organization among a Central Asian Turkic speaking 
Population (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
1975); Paul Georg Geiss, PreTsarist and Tsarist Central 
Asia: Communal Commitment and Political Order in 
Change (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Arminius 
Vambery,  Travels in Central Asia (New York: Harper, 
1865).  
Berdymuhammedov may be of lesser importance than 
the way in which the transition of power was effected, 
and its implications for future leadership successions. 
The State Security Council, led by General Akmurad 
Rejepov, the long-standing head of Niyazov’s 
Presidential Guard, effectively appointed 
Berdymuhammedov and then, crucially, obtained 
constitutional amendments at the subsequent Khalk 
Maslahaty session that gave it the right to determine 
whether a president is physically fit to retain office, 
and to nominate an interim successor if not. In 
practice, this gives the State Security Council 
legitimate powers to remove Berdymuhammedov 
should he prove to be insufficiently compliant, and to 
replace him with another, more suitable candidate. As 
a member of the Ersari tribe from the Lebap region, 
Rejepov would possibly have been unacceptable as a 
presidential candidate to the Khalk Maslahaty, with 
its strong Ahal Teke tribal base. However, although 
Berdymuhammedov may yet gain political traction of 
his own (in the way that those other post-Soviet 
placemen, President Vladimir Putin in Russia and 
President Imomali Rakhmonov in Tajikistan, have 
done), the periodic distribution of power between 
tribal elites during the Soviet period may have been 
executed in de facto if not de jure form.
6 
The promises of social and economic liberalisation 
made by Berdymuhammedov and the other candidates 
before the February 2007 election indicate that there 
was a consensus among political elites that some form 
of major change is needed. There is no evidence that 
there was significant tension in Turkmen society, or 
that the reform pledges were a response to pressure 
from below. Rather the proposals signify that a new 
elite settlement is being worked through, probably 
along the following lines: 
i)  a more predictable, stable, rational system of 
governance manifested by the return of ministers 
shown the door by Niyazov; 
ii)  the termination of harmful and arbitrary policies 
that were the product of Niyazov’s prejudices 
and paranoia, such as the amputation of 
components of the state cultural, education and 
health sectors; 
iii)  a clean slate for state officials suspected of filing 
falsified reports of agricultural production and 
colluding with each other to deceive central 
government; 
iv)  the release and partial rehabilitation of socially 
significant senior government officials 
imprisoned for corruption;  
                                                 
6 For Soviet “tribal policy” in Turkmenistan, see Adrienne 
Lynn Edgar, Tribal Nation: the Making of Soviet 
Turkmenistan (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004); Shokhrat Kadyrov, “Ethnos, State and Political 
Struggle”, unpublished paper presented at the Oxford 
Society for Central Asia Turkmenistan Workshop, St. 
Antony’s College, Oxford, 18 June 2004.   
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v)  a compact on minimum state welfare provision, 
including the restoration of pensions abolished in 
January 2006, the maintenance of existing 
subsidies on water, gas and fuel, and the 
assurance of uninterrupted supplies of cheap 
flour; 
vi)  a cautious programme of controlled liberalisation 
that excludes political reform but involves 
modestly increasing social freedoms, including 
increased access to the internet, perhaps more 
foreign travel and overseas scholarships for 
students, and greater openness to foreign 
investment; 
vii)  the preservation of ethnic Turkmen hegemony 
over Uzbek and Russian minorities, but without 
explicit and aggressive discrimination; 
viii) the funding of the above programmes through the 
capture and repatriation of significant gas and 
cotton revenues that were placed in Foreign 
Exchange Reserve Fund (FERF) accounts with 
Deutsche Bank under Niyazov’s personal 
control.
7 
The policy announcements made thus far suggest that 
the restoration of social cohesion is the new 
president’s principal priority. Rapid and far-reaching 
education reforms to be enacted include a reversion of 
the mandatory period of schooling back to ten years, a 
40% rise in teachers’ pay, and significant relaxation 
of regulations for university students, including 
exemption from military service, abolition of the two 
compulsory gap years, extension of degree schemes 
back to their Soviet level, and an end to restrictions 
on university study abroad. The second major policy 
shift initiated by Berdymuhammedov has been the 
restoration of state pensions to their pre-January 2006 
position. Cuts in eligibility had created significant 
hardship, particularly within the ethnic Russian 
population. These measures will place additional 
strain on the public finances, but higher gas export 
revenues, savings made by abandoning some of 
Niyazov’s more outlandish public works projects, and 
firmer controls on official corruption will go some 
way to bridging any deficit. Moreover, the political 
dividends of populist reforms are likely to outweigh 
short-term budgetary considerations.  
Berdymuhammedov has been notably more cautious 
in tackling structural reform in the agricultural sector. 
The logical conclusion to draw from the convening of 
the extraordinary Khalk Maslahaty session on 30-31 
March 2007 specifically to address this issue, was that 
the government was planning a major announcement 
along the lines of large-scale land privatisation. 
                                                 
7 For the candidates’ election platforms, see NewsCentral 
Asia’s coverage (www.newscentralasia.org); Bruce 
Pannier, “Turkmenistan: Sorting out the Presidential 
Candidates”, RFE/RL Newsline, 7 February 2007, “Election 
pledges raise hope of change”, IRINnews, 12 February 
2007.  
Instead, the session, with Berdymuhammedov 
assuming the role of Chairman, gave plenty of space 
for the airing of grievances, but actually proposed 
only to ensure that farmers received ‘inputs’ (feed, 
fertiliser, seeds etc) and state payments in a more 
efficient and timely fashion. More wide-ranging 
reforms may follow later in 2007, but it would appear 
that, for the present, the government is hoping to 
rebuild trust with farmers in order to give the existing 
system a chance to function more effectively.  
Although EU member states will keep a watching 
brief on the progress of these reforms, particular 
attention is likely to be paid to progress on human 
rights issues. A handful of non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) reports were critical of human 
rights abuses in Turkmenistan earlier in Niyazov’s 
presidency, but it was only after the failed coup 
attempt of 25 November 2002 that the international 
community subjected the Niyazov regime to serious 
scrutiny and censure. In spring 2003, the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
invoked its ‘Moscow Mechanism’ for the first, and so 
far only, occasion since the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia in 1993. The Turkmen government did 
not cooperate with the subsequent report prepared by 
Professor Emmanuel Decaux, which was highly 
critical of the policy of interrogating relatives of the 
suspected coup plotters, of the conditions of their 
detention, and of the judicial process all the way 
through to sentencing.
8 Niyazov remained similarly 
unmoved by the passing of a non-binding UN General 
Assembly Resolution of 20 December 2004, which 
called on the Turkmen government to release 
prisoners of conscience, and adhere to its 
commitments on freedoms of thought, conscience and 
religion. Further reports prepared by the Open Society 
Institute, Amnesty International, the International 
Crisis Group, the London School of Tropical 
Hygiene, the Turkmenistan Helsinki Initiative, and 
the International League for Human Rights have 
condemned the political hospitalisation of dissidents, 
conditions in civilian and military prisons, the 
treatment of ethnic minorities, the bullying and 
exploitation endured by army conscripts, the drastic 
reduction in primary health care provision, and the 
deterioration of education provision. But all with 
limited impact on policy.  
The extent to which the power brokers in the new 
regime, many of whom are responsible for abuses 
perpetrated under Niyazov, are serious about 
improving human rights is wholly unclear. If reports 
from inside the country are accurate, the 
Berdymuhammedov era began inauspiciously with a 
serious riot in the notorious Ovadan-Depe political 
prison on 22 December 2006, leading to the killing of 
                                                 
8 Emmanuel Decaux, OSCE Rapporteur’s Report on 
Turkmenistan, (Vienna: OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, 2003).    
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23 prisoners by special forces.
9 This prison has 
reportedly since been closed and demolished, which 
indicates some sensitivity to international opinion.
10 
To some degree, the extent to which the new regime 
wishes to re-engage with the international community 
will determine its sensitivity to criticism. With both 
Russia and China steadfastly refusing to comment on 
the country’s internal affairs, however, the regime 
has, in the event of sustained Western criticism, solid 
‘fall-back’ options in its choice of strategic partners.  
A multiplicity of new challenges is also likely to 
emerge, not least of which is the puzzle of how to 
manage sensitively the process of decultification. It is 
likely that the Niyazov cult will remain in place for 
the time being, minus the expensive construction 
projects. A Khrushchev style ‘secret speech’ is not 
(yet at least) on the cards. Niyazov’s profile still 
appears on all state television programmes, and new 
treatises (allegedly) penned by Niyazov are appearing 
posthumously. Against that, the new government has 
announced that Niyazov’s name has been dropped 
from the state oath,
11 and that new bank notes will no 
longer carry his image. Pointedly, Turkmen state 
television broadcast an opera (which had been banned 
by Niyazov) on the night of the presidential election 
for the first time in several years.
12 Any ‘thaw’ is 
likely to take the form of a gentle ‘crowding out’ of 
Niyazov’s presence rather than open disavowal.
13 
Niyazov’s death may also allow some free play for 
the reassertion of sub-national identities. The dire 
warnings of state collapse after Niyazov were not 
predicated on substantive in-country research, or even 
serious comparative analysis. Turkmenistan has, by 
and large, an apolitical society. The number of 
pressure points that might trigger conflict is low – the 
spatial distribution and sparseness of the population 
ensures that there are few communal conflicts over 
land, water, religion or ethnicity. The suspension of 
Niyazov’s elaborate construction projects, and a more 
equitable distribution of rental income to those 
regions (Balkan, Mary and Lebap) where gas reserves 
are located, would do much to alleviate discontent at 
the channelling of government revenues into the 
capital city of Ashgabat, the historic centre of Ahal 
Teke influence. However, there is no guarantee that 
this will occur and the traditionally delicate balance of 
regional interests in the oil and gas bureaucracy may 
require careful management in order to prevent senior 
officials from embezzling funds that they view as 
rightfully belonging to their tribe or region. 
Developing this issue, the reported amnesty of 
                                                 
9 Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation sources in 
Kommersant International, 19 January 2007. 
10 Ferghana.Ru, 6 February 2007.  
11 Reuters, 21 February 2007. 
12 RFE/RL Newsline, 12 February 2007. 
13 For example, the re-introduction of physical education 
and new school texts would reduce the amount of time 
devoted to study of the Ruhnama.  
powerful state oligarchs, such as former Oil and Gas 
supremo Yolly Gurbanmuradov, in January 2007, 
indicates that a further complex realignment and 
upheaval of elites could be under way.
14 
Of potentially more concern from a hard security 
perspective would be an assertion of the regional 
power of narco-clans along the Iranian and Afghan 
border. It is believed that Niyazov maintained fairly 
tight control over narco-trafficking routes, effectively 
licensing certain activities in exchange for political 
quiescence in the Mary region.
15 There is no 
guarantee that this compact will hold with a weaker 
successor regime that is unable to constrain powerful 
clients with autonomous cross-border links to Afghan 
suppliers, particularly as Niyazov’s principal fixer 
and personal banker, former Afghan war veteran 
Alexander Zhadan, appears to have disappeared. The 
training of Turkmen border guards is generally 
considered to be woeful, and the unpromising terrain 
along the border is likely to allow the Kushka clans to 
bypass ‘authorised’ trafficking channels, with the 
consequence that an alternative set of patronage 
networks could develop outside the control of the 
state.  
Accordingly, while the promises of reform are a 
positive indication of serious intent to respond to the 
more egregious legacies of Niyazov’s rule, they may 
uncover or unleash a set of ‘second order’ problems, 
such as uncontrolled corruption, intense ethno-
regional bargaining, and organised criminal activity 
that cannot be successfully captured and controlled by 
the state. As the example of Kyrgyzstan since the 
Tulip Revolution has shown, these problems have 
tended to arise when a multiplication of political 
actors combines with the fragmentation of the 
political agenda.  
The energy sector 
The death of Niyazov has given rise to considerable 
speculation that the new government may seek to 
diversify its natural gas export options by reaching a 
commercial agreement on gas sales, either with 
individual EU member states, or with the EU 
collectively. Turkmen gas would be delivered by way 
of a subsea Caspian extension to the new Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE) South Caucasus pipeline 
which, in turn, would be connected to the projected 
Nabucco pipeline servicing the major European gas 
junction situated at Baumgarten in Austria. President 
Niyazov rejected such an option, preferring to 
maintain a core gas relationship with Gazprom, while 
                                                 
14 Ferghana.Ru, 6 February 2007. 
15 Author’s private interviews with Turkmen and Azeri 
sources conducted in various locations in Turkmenistan 
between November 2002 and May 2005, and in Baku, 
November 2006. See also “Cracks in the Marble: 
Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship”, International Crisis 
Group Asia Report No. 44, 2003.   
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developing projects to export supplemental volumes 
south-east, through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India 
(the now largely defunct TAPI pipeline project) and, 
pursuant to a preliminary agreement signed in April 
2006, east to China.  
The export of significant onshore gas volumes in a 
westerly direction is possible but unlikely. Russia, 
through Gazprom, maintains a tight grip on the 
existing pipeline infrastructure in Central Asia and 
has a 25 year supply contract covering almost all of 
Turkmenistan’s current gas export capacity. Turkmen 
gas output has stalled since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and requires external technology, capital and 
expertise, which Gazprom will provide, to restore 
production to Soviet levels.
16 The Russian-Turkmen 
relationship is symbiotic. Gazprom provides a steady 
revenue stream and is responsible for pipeline 
maintenance and upgrading, and attaches no 
conditionality on human rights and democratisation 
issues. Russia/Gazprom has (or can adopt) a Soviet 
modus operandi with which the Turkmen elite feels 
comfortable. From the other side, Turkmen exports 
enable Gazprom to service its lucrative European 
contracts, and provide an important supply bridge 
before the Yamal peninsula project comes onstream. 
Thus, Gazprom will not surrender its hegemony in 
Turkmenistan lightly and, as yet, there is insufficient 
incentive for the Turkmen leadership to look seriously 
elsewhere.  
However, while the principal onshore eastern fields 
have been effectively ‘booked’ by Russia (and the 
new Yolotan field by China), there is potential for 
European international oil companies (IOCs) to look 
carefully at developing some of the more interesting 
                                                 
16 There is wide variation between Turkmen and external 
sources on the extent of the country’s recoverable oil and 
gas reserves. Turkmengeologiya declared on 14 November 
2005 that recoverable natural gas reserves were 20.415 
trillion cubic metres (tcm), approximately 10% of global 
reserves (NewsCentralAsia, 14 November 2005). BP’s 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2006 is far more 
conservative, estimating 2.9 tcm. The last published 
independent Russian audit, undertaken by VNIIgaz, 
estimated 7.84 tcm, which would place Turkmenistan 
fourth on the global list. Source: Ottar Skagen, Caspian 
Gas (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 
1997), p.7. Production during the Soviet period peaked in 
1990 at 90 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year. Production 
in 2005 was 63 bcm (Global Insight Country Report, 
accessed 14 September 2006). Target production for 2006 
was 80 bcm (APS Review Gas Market Trends, Vol. 67 No. 
12, 18 September 2006), but this was unlikely to have been 
met. Estimates of oil reserves vary even more widely, 
between 171 billion barrels according to Turkmengeologiya 
(NewsCentralAsia, 14 November 2005) and 500 million 
barrels according to BP’s Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2006. Production has more than doubled since 1995 
due to increased foreign investment, but is currently static 
at around 190,000 barrels per day, below the government’s 
annual target of 70 million barrels for 2006 (APS Review 
Gas Market Trends, Vol. 67 No. 12, 18 September 2006). 
offshore fields, notably the Livanov-Barinova-Lam 
(LBL) structures, which are geologically integrated 
with the large Azeri Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) 
deepwater oil and gas fields, currently under 
commercial development by BP. While these 
prospective fields will not substitute entirely for 
Russian gas supplies, they will substantially augment 
existing Caspian basin volumes, and have relatively 
inexpensive tieback potential to western Caspian 
infrastructure, without disturbing Gazprom’s existing 
contracts and provoking a reaction against European 
IOCs working in Russia.  
The focus on downstream activities has led European 
policy-makers to completely neglect very serious 
governance issues in the domestic energy sector. No 
part of the state apparatus experienced more upheaval 
in the final eighteen months of Niyazov’s rule than 
did the state energy bureaucracy. The frequent 
dismissal and rotation of state officials and ministers 
was characteristic of Niyazov’s rule. However, the 
purging of the sector’s most senior and competent 
personnel from May 2005 was supplemented by 
drastic structural reorganisation (see Appendix for 
structure as at mid-2005, to which the new 
government may revert). The resultant bottlenecks 
effectively precluded officials from executing policy, 
engaging with foreign operators, or monitoring 
effectively existing commercial operations.  
The two most powerful and longstanding members of 
Niyazov’s entourage – Deputy Prime Minister for Oil 
and Gas Yolly Gurbanmuradov and Head of the 
Presidential Administration Rejep Saparov – were 
both dismissed, tried and given long prison sentences 
for embezzlement in the early summer of 2005. It is 
believed that each was briefing against the other, and 
Niyazov took no chances by sequentially removing 
both.
17 They were followed by a procession of other 
officials: the chairmen of Turkmenneftegaz, 
Turkmenneft, Turkmengaz and Turkmengeologiya, 
four of the country’s five state energy agencies, were 
removed and jailed, along with the head of the 
Turkmenbashi oil refinery and the chairman of the 
Central Bank. Nearly all of their replacements were, 
in turn, removed over the ensuing year, creating a 
form of ‘permanent revolution’ in the upper reaches 
of the energy bureaucracy. It is difficult to gauge to 
what extent the charges laid were real or imagined, 
although official toleration of some level of 
corruption in the oil and gas business was believed to 
exist. It is possible that Rejepov and Gurbanmuradov 
had overstepped permissible limits or that they were 
seeking to transform their financial leverage into 
political muscle.  
The damaging shortage of experienced personnel was 
compounded by Niyazov’s decision on 2 September 
2005 to abolish the Competent Body (the interface 
                                                 
17 Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) Special 
Report No. 402, 12 August 2005.  
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with foreign oil companies) and transfer its 
responsibilities and operations, along with those of 
Turkmenneftegaz, to the Ministry of Oil and Gas.
18 
Three quarters of the core staff concerned with the 
negotiation, licensing and control of contracts were 
sacked, and there were no clear lines of demarcation 
or authority within the Ministry for the 
implementation of executive decrees or new 
legislation. Such was the paralysis that ensued (allied 
to the fact that the legal signatory of Production 
Sharing Agreements with foreign companies is the 
Competent Body), that Niyazov informally 
reconstituted the Competent Body on 15 December 
2005 to act on a strict case-by-case basis under his 
personal control, reportedly signing off personally 
LNG sale contracts of only $10,000.
19 
One of the most important issues facing President 
Berdymuhammedov was to reconstitute the state oil 
and gas bureaucracy and restore the negotiation, 
licensing and control functions to the Competent 
Body. This he did on 12 April 2007 with the creation 
of a new State Agency for management of 
hydrocarbon resources, which essentially assumed the 
functions of the disbanded Competent Body and will 
be an important step in facilitating further foreign 
investment in the sector. Turkmenistan’s relative 
diplomatic isolation can be partly explained by the 
acute shortage of competent personnel working at mid 
and upper levels of government, and their consequent 
lack of confidence and vision in dealing with IOCs 
and international institutions.
20 Not knowing what to 
do, officials have chosen to do nothing. This has been 
to the immeasurable benefit of Russia and Gazprom. 
There is, therefore, an important role for the EU in 
helping to equip a new generation of civil servants 
and technical specialists to serve effectively in 
government. 
Foreign Policy 
Turkmenistan has followed a policy of permanent 
neutrality since shortly after the collapse of the Soviet 
                                                 
18 For the implications of this decision, see Jonathan H. 
Hines and Alexander V. Marchenko, “Turkmenistan’s Oil 
and Gas sector: Overview of the Legal Regime for Foreign 
Investment”, revised draft of unpublished paper prepared 
for LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene and MacRae LLP, 30 May 
2006. Additional unpublished and confidential commercial 
sources, that cannot be specifically referenced, were also 
used for this section of the paper.  
19 Author’s interview with Ilham Shaban, Editor of “Turan-
Energy Bulletin”, Baku, 15 November 2006.  
20 The Turkmen negotiating team on the Caspian Sea 
Working Group does not deviate from a set line agreed in 
advance of negotiations, according to interviews conducted 
by the author with two senior Azeri Foreign Ministry 
officials on 15 and 16 November 2006. The inability of 
officials to negotiate with IOCs effectively was confirmed 
to the author by a British oil company representative 
resident in Turkmenistan for several years (interview 
conducted in London on 23 February 2007). 
Union in December 1991. This stance was formally 
recognised by UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/50/80 passed on 12 December 1995, and then 
codified into domestic law on 27 December 1995. 
Niyazov engaged only minimally with the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and even 
sought unsuccessfully to downgrade Turkmen status 
to Associate Membership in August 2005.
21 Niyazov 
did not accede to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), or the Eurasian Economic 
Community and has had highly circumscribed contact 
with the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme.  
The rationale for this policy lies in several 
interconnected factors. The perceived loss of 
sovereignty in joining regional security institutions 
could have led to situations where Turkmenistan 
became a weak frontline state against countries such 
as Iran and Afghanistan, with whom it has no 
individual quarrel. The precursor of the SCO was 
very much geared to containing Taliban influence 
whereas, somewhat paradoxically, Niyazov 
maintained cordial relations with the Taliban 
leadership. Secondly, threats to Turkmenistan’s 
sovereignty are more likely to emanate from 
unresolved border disputes with Uzbekistan, but the 
CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST) has no mutual 
defence or conflict resolution provisions for CST 
signatories who are attacked by other CST states. 
Finally, Turkmen foreign policy is founded on not 
prejudicing either transit routes or markets for its 
natural gas exports, hence the emphasis on functional 
bilateral ties with Iran, Russia and Kazakhstan.
22  
The only significant change that can be expected from 
the new government is to extend these underlying 
principles to a wider set of actors. In practice, this 
means cementing relatively close relations with 
China, defrosting relations with Azerbaijan, and 
cautiously engaging with the US and European 
states.
23 Such engagement may take the form of 
exploratory discussions on new gas export routes,  but 
could also encompass issues such as anti-terrorist and 
counter-narcotics cooperation,  the provision of 
university places for Turkmen students and assistance 
                                                 
21 Turkmenistan has no dealings with the CIS Interstate 
Bank or the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, and does not 
forward data to the CIS Interstate Statistical Committee 
(Izvestiya, 3 June 2004). The application to downgrade 
membership was refused because Niyazov did not attend 
the CIS Heads of State summit in Kazan to sign off the 
relevant documents (Russica Izvestiya, 27 August 2005).  
22 See Nadia Badykova, “Turkmenistan’s Quest for 
Economic Security” in Gennady Chufrin (ed.), The Security 
of the Caspian Sea Region, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), pp. 231-243. 
23 The only official visit by Niyazov to Azerbaijan occurred 
on 18-19 March 1996, and the only official visit by an 
Azeri head of state was made by President Heidar Aliyev 
on 26-27 October 1994 (Source: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Azerbaijan, October 2006).   
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on curriculum development, teacher training, 
installation of new facilities, and provision of 
textbooks in the secondary and tertiary education 
sectors. The major obstacles to a more developed 
‘Western dimension’ to Turkmen foreign policy lie in 
a mixture of functional and intangible issues. The first 
of these is the long-running dispute with Azerbaijan 
over the ownership of the Kyapaz/Serdar oil and gas 
fields in the central Caspian Sea. This disagreement is 
one of the core factors preventing an overall 
resolution of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. 
Settlement would also provide the key to the 
development and tieback of Turkmen offshore fields 
into existing Azeri infrastructure, because 
Kyapaz/Serdar lies midway between, and forms part 
of, the ACG and LBL structures described above. The 
inexorable logic of a jointly developed, cross-border 
exploration and production project would be for the 
oil and gas produced to transit the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) and BTE oil and gas pipelines to 
service European markets. The present stalemate suits 
both Russia and Iran, the losers in East-West transport 
corridor initiatives. However, the Azeri government is 
apparently keen to resolve the issue, and there might 
be a role for the EU, as an honest-broker, to assist 
with mediation and in formulating the technical 
criteria for demarcation of the border outside of the 
existing Caspian Sea Working Group framework.
24 
The more intangible issues revolve around the 
regime’s fear of external influences. Students sent 
abroad to study might never return, or alternatively, 
might import values and aspirations that contradict 
the government’s rather unsophisticated nation-
building exercise and authoritarian methods of 
control. However, the government may have to take 
this chance, because otherwise the opportunities for 
those with an education to emigrate might simply 
multiply in any event. There is pretence in Turkmen 
public life that the population operates and thinks 
along the narrow lines laid down by official 
propaganda. The reality is different and more 
complex. Turkmen watch Russian satellite television 
and Bollywood films, and selectively lock into and 
drift out of official discourse when it is instrumentally 
profitable to do so. Alexei Yurchak records how late 
Soviet citizens increasingly removed themselves from 
state-directed leisure spaces, simultaneously living 
within the system’s formal constraints, and yet not 
following its parameters
25. This vnye (outside) style 
of everyday living, preferencing svoi (autonomously 
constructed) social networks over officially 
                                                 
24 Azeri Foreign Ministry sources indicated that, while the 
government “would never give Kyapaz away on the 
whole”, it would entertain a joint sovereignty/development 
solution (Source: Author interview, Baku, 14 November 
2006). Iran still disputes the principle of median line 
division of the seabed. 
25 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever Until It Was 
No More: The Last Soviet Generation, (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
sanctioned activities does not entail the disparaging of 
the system as a whole. Rather it involves carving a 
niche within it. Field research conducted in 
Turkmenistan between 2002 and 2005 suggests that 
this was also true of life under Niyazov. However, 
without his remorseless and very real domination of 
public life, it would be unrealistic for the new 
government to insist that the existing cult vocabulary 
constructed under Niyazov can still resonate with the 
same strength. The government’s response to this 
social legacy of the Niyazov era will be a critical 
determinant of the extent to which greater diplomatic 
engagement by the EU will translate into 
opportunities to develop civil society and commercial 
partnerships.  
Recommendations for the EU  
Turkmenistan is not so much at a crossroads as at the 
start of a journey. The shape and trajectory of the new 
political order is not yet definitively known. President 
Berdymuhammedov was, in the immediate hours after 
Niyazov’s death, the beneficiary of a Security Council 
putsch that displaced Niyazov’s constitutional 
successor. The Security Council has since 
consolidated its power by engineering three 
constitutional amendments that effectively enable it to 
dictate, or at the very least broker, the terms of future 
succession arrangements. Removing Berdy-
muhammedov from power is now a much more 
straightforward constitutional exercise than it would 
have been in Niyazov’s time. The major Security 
Council players remain in post five months later, and 
there has been no attempt to reform the ‘power 
ministries’.  
However, Berdymuhammedov has made an assured 
start and undoubtedly gained some independent 
political traction and genuine popularity of his own, 
assisted by a calm and reasonable manner, and astute 
prioritisation of early reforms. Although he may not 
be as comfortable as Niyazov with the technical 
details of the hydrocarbon sector, Berdy-
muhammedov’s considered approach to policy-
making is a welcome antidote to the extravagances 
and idiosyncracies of Niyazov’s rule. Berdy-
muhammedov also appears able to maintain the 
sometimes fragile informal coalitions that hold the 
state together. The new government is clearly 
dominated by Ahal Tekes, but the presence of 
Rejepov, from the eastern Lebap region, and the 
appointment of Tachberdi Tagiyev, a Western Yomut, 
to run the oil and gas sector, indicates that there is 
tribal balance and pluralism within the inner circle of 
power. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that 
Berdymuhammedov, with the backing of the Security 
Council, cannot remain in power for the forseeable 
future. 
The EU can assist in getting the country moving in a 
secular, progressive, modernising direction that will 
balance necessary structural reforms with continuing  
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welfare provision, particularly in the area of treatment 
for drug addiction, penal reform and housing, in order 
to protect the most vulnerable and impoverished 
section of the community. Before it does so, it has to 
order its own priorities. The first of these is to decide 
whether democracy promotion initiatives are 
normative or instrumental. The encouragement of, 
and then subsequent withdrawal of support for, 
democracy activists in Azerbaijan in 2003 and 2005 
greatly damaged the EU’s reputation among reformist 
elements in that country. At present, the EU has no 
significant interests in Turkmenistan and can afford to 
be purist in its approach, encouraging, but also 
maintaining pressure on, the new regime to adhere to 
normative international commitments on human 
rights issues. Instrumental democracy promotion can 
slip into support for authoritarianism, as the US 
government found in Uzbekistan between 2001 and 
2005. The purist approach is, in many ways, the 
simplest and the noblest. To work, however, it must 
be consistent and committed and must give Turkmen 
people both ownership and authorship of the political 
process.
26  
The conscious subordination of democracy promotion 
to engagement on technical issues as a means of 
prefiguring wider social empowerment could also be 
justified, and might yield more measurable results in 
the medium-term. This approach would entail helping 
the government govern better, and focus on 
improving the opportunities and livelihoods of 
Turkmen rather than seeking formal democratic 
outcomes.  
The EU can initiate a number of practical, non-
threatening and predominantly ‘apolitical’ measures, 
in conjunction with other institutions such as the 
OSCE, EBRD and UN agencies, that would tangibly 
improve governance and living standards, and gently 
help to lead the country out of isolation. The EU 
should not seek to push the new government too far 
too fast, but could formulate attainable development 
objectives – for example, an English language text 
book for every primary school child within two years, 
or the provision of modern drug treatment centres in 
each of the country’s five regional capitals. That 
would make a tangible difference, without disrupting 
the balance of domestic political forces, or 
undercutting the government’s own reform agenda. 
Similarly, the EU has a role in working with the grain 
of government proposals to increase civic space. Post-
Communist leaders have shown themselves to be 
adept at speaking back to Euro-Atlantic institutions 
their preferred agendas without enacting much in the 
way of meaningful reforms. Thus, Berdy-
muhammedov’s expressed intention to provide 
internet access for every village is a matter of public 
                                                 
26 See Gordon Crawford, “Promoting Democratic 
Governance in Central Asia: Barriers for External Actors”, 
unpublished paper presented at CORE conference, 
Hamburg, 9-11 February 2007.  
record, and a role for the EU could be to ‘hold him to 
account’ on the pledge by offering to assist with the 
provision of computer hardware and dial-up facilities. 
Guidance is also essential on a more specialised 
technical level, for example training government and 
state agency officials in commercial contract drafting 
and in developing advocacy and judicial expertise, 
and court procedures that would increase the 
country’s juridical capacity. 
The recommendations above do not presuppose a 
developing political relationship between the EU and 
Turkmenistan. It would be fair to say that the 
prioritisation of democratisation and human rights 
issues by the EU in its March 2007 strategy document 
will, in the medium-term, engender suspicion and 
prevent the development of close bilateral relations. 
Unless the EU is prepared to instrumentalise or set 
aside the promotion of ‘European values’, perhaps for 
the sake of a long-term gas supply contract through a 
trans-Caspian pipeline, then some wariness and 
conscious distancing on the Turkmen side is 
inevitable. Moreover, the EU would be wise not 
expect too much from its energy dialogue. At present, 
the Turkmen leadership has very few incentives to 
ditch its long-term gas supply contracts to Russia and 
China. The prospect of large volumes of onshore 
Turkmen gas from the eastern Dauletebad and 
Yolotan fields being moved across the Caspian Sea 
and directly routed to Europe remains a remote and, 
in many respects, unfeasible prospect. As noted 
above, the focus of EU policy should be directed at 
encouraging European companies to develop 
promising offshore fields and then facilitating 
tiebacks to existing offshore infrastructure on the 
Western side of the Caspian. Although Turkmenistan 
will miss out on some downstream processing, such 
an arrangement would carry far less diplomatic and 
environmental baggage than an expensive setpiece 
pipeline project across legally contested waters, and 
still be able to make a more than marginal addition to 
volumes presently being transported through the BTC 
and BTE pipelines. 
The EU should, therefore be realistic in its ambitions 
by pressing hard on Turkmenistan’s existing treaty 
commitments if and when certain minimum standards 
of human rights observance are breached, but by 
generally adopting a policy of positive engagement 
and encouragement when things are ‘ticking over’. In 
this sense, EU External Relations Commissioner 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner was right, after her meeting 
with Turkmen foreign ministry officials on the 
sidelines EU-Central Asia summit in Astana on 29 
March 2007, to praise the reforms so far enacted and 
offer friendly encouragement for deeper dialogue. It 
would be fair to conclude that Turkmen as much as 
outsiders are looking forward to a fresh start in the 
country, but they must feel that they are both author 
and owner of any processes of reform and 
liberalisation for them to succeed. Within this 
framework, the 15 recommendations listed below are  
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by no means exhaustive, but would, if implemented, 
represent a modest start and a basis for deeper 
engagement:  
•  The provision of EU scholarships in business, 
government, medicine, engineering, chemistry 
and agricultural management for Turkmen 
students 
•  Assistance with the provision of textbooks and 
other learning materials in the Turkmen, Russian 
and English languages for primary and secondary 
school pupils, teacher training through 
educational exchanges, assistance with sports 
facilities and computer equipment. Teacher 
training may be interesting too 
•  Technical assistance on restoring a functioning 
state oil and gas bureaucratic apparatus, including 
the Competent Body, and assistance with legal 
and commercial issues arising from the 
negotiation, performance and enforcement of 
PSAs 
•  The provision of scholarships and technical 
training for future oil and gas sector workers 
•  Assistance in the drafting of tighter local content 
laws for PSAs and construction contracts 
•  Short-term assistance in primary and preventive 
healthcare directed at rural communities 
•  Assistance in the reform of the agricultural sector, 
including water conservation, sanitation and 
environmental management, irrigation, livestock 
care, and in modification of the existing state 
purchasing system 
•  Grants for the construction of water purification 
systems, particularly in smaller towns and 
villages 
•  Enhanced cooperation and training on border 
security and drug interdiction 
•  Assistance in the monitoring and improvement of 
conditions in remand centres (Sizos), civilian and 
military prisons (including women’s prisons), and 
psychiatric hospitals 
•  The presentation of constructive options for a 
Western transit route for oil and gas products 
•  Mediation in the Caspian Sea border dispute with 
Azerbaijan over the disputed Kyapaz/Serdar 
fields 
•  Recognition of the previous government’s role in 
ending the Tajik civil war by helping 
Turkmenistan fulfil its aspiration of hosting a 
regional conflict prevention, mediation and 
resolution centre, that would lend content, value 
and prestige to the country’s permanent neutrality 
status 
•  Assistance with the establishment and 
management of a National Gas Fund to sterilise 
gas revenues and prevent ‘Dutch Disease’ 
•  Technical assistance in developing new, non-state 
media outlets (including Internet provision) and 
reviving the national film industry.  
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President: 
 
Oversight of sector 
and signs PSAs and 
sale contracts 
Cabinet of Ministers: 
 
Delegated power to 
sign contracts 
 
Some representation 
on re-instated 
Competent Body 
Oil and Gas Ministry:
 
Controls state 
companies 
Competent Body: 
 
Interface with foreign 
investors 
 
Functions transferred 
into Oil and Gas 
Ministry in September 
2005, but re-instated 
on a case-by-case 
basis under 
presidential control 
after 15 December 
2005 
Turkmenneft: 
 
Offshore oil 
production 
Turkmenneftegaz: 
 
Refining, marketing, 
distribution of oil and 
gas 
 
Functions transferred 
into Oil and Gas 
Ministry and State 
Commodities 
Exchange in 
September 2005 
Turkmengaz: 
 
Onshore gas 
production 
Turkmengeologiya: 
 
Hydrocarbon 
exploration 
Turkmenneftegazstroi:
 
Construction for oil 
and gas sector 